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Abstract
This paper reconsiders the welfare benefit of unemployment insurance when individuals
might self−insure through private savings but face aggregate fluctuations. We conclude that
previous studies have under−estimated by half the average welfare gain from unemployment
benefit by ignoring aggregate price and employment uncertainty. But paradoxically enough,
the poorest are less in favour of unemployment benefit when business cycles are taken into
account. This result is due to favorable price effects which dominate the unemployment
uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
A recent strand of the literature reassesses the optimal level of unemployment benefits
when individuals may also rely on private savings to buﬀer against unemployment risks.
Since self-insurance with a riskless asset has long been shown to achieve almost perfect
insurance against idiosyncratic income risks (Aiyagari 1994), the current literature con-
cludes that the additional insurance eﬀect of unemployment benefits is nil in this context
(Wang and Williamson 1999, Rogerson and Schindler 2002).
However these previous studies ignore aggregate fluctuations. This key assumption
might have led to an over-estimation of self-insurance for two main reasons. The first one
can be referred to as an employment fluctuations eﬀect. Savings and borrowing are less
likely to be able to smooth consumption during longer unemployment spells caused by
recessions such as those in Europe. The second reason can be referred to as a price fluc-
tuations eﬀect. The level of insurance provided by savings and unemployment insurance
crucially depends on interest rates and wage fluctuations. Furthermore, price fluctuations
can have important redistributive eﬀects depending on households’ asset holdings (Krusell
and Smith 2002).
To what extent do these macroeconomic considerations matter in assessing the welfare
benefit of unemployment insurance under incomplete markets? The aim of this paper is
to address this issue by disentangling the two employment and price eﬀects. The welfare
analysis is run under a general equilibrium incomplete markets model à la Krusell and
Smith (1998) calibrated on two polar business cycles cases : those of America and Europe.
The average welfare benefit of public unemployment insurance turns out to be significant
under this general equilibrium set-up. Conversely, ignoring business cycle considerations
reduces by half the average welfare benefit of unemployment insurance. The diﬀerence is
accounted for equally by price and employment fluctuations.
Yet the average welfare measure hides some paradoxical distribution eﬀects of aggre-
gate fluctuations. The poorest are less in favour of unemployment benefit when business
cycles are taken into account even though they face more unemployment risks. This result
is due to favorable general equilibrium price eﬀects in incomplete markets economies. The
increase in uncertainty leads to higher precautionary savings and aggregate capital stock,
lowering the productivity of capital but increasing that of labor. Consequently, wages
are higher while interest rates are lower under aggregate fluctuations. This benefits to
the poorest who are essentially employed or unemployed people holding few assets. This
income eﬀect reduces the need for public unemployment insurance precisely for those who
are the most concerned by this policy, shedding new lights on redistributive policies.
2 The model
The model builds on Krusell and Smith’s (1998) incomplete markets set up. The economy
consists of a continuum of individuals - normalized to one - facing both idiosyncratic un-
employment risks and aggregate uncertainty. The value function v() of a given individual
is represented by
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v(k, ², ;λ, z) = max
c,k0≥0
{u(c) + βE[v(k0, ²0;λ, z)|(², k;λ, z))
under the constraints
c+ k0 = rk + wµ(²) + (1− δ)k with k0 ≥ 0 (1)
where u() is a standard CRRA utility function, c the level of consumption, β the
subjective time discount factor, k an agent’s asset holdings, k0 the next period level of
asset constrained to be positive. The only good consumed is produced by a representative
firm according to an aggregate Cobb-Douglas technology F (z,K, L) combining capital K,
labor input L. The production function is aﬀected by an aggregate productivity shock
z governed by a Markov process taking on two values : zg in good times and zb in bad
times.
In each period, an agent faces an idiosyncratic shock ² on the labor market and can be
either employed ² =e or unemployed ² =u. If public insurance is available, the unemployed
own a fraction µ(u) = ρ of current wages while the employed pay taxes ( µ(e) = 1− τ) so
that the public insurance scheme is balanced in each period. Conversely, in the absence of
public insurance, µ(u)=0 and µ(e)=1. The stochastic employment opportunity ² follows
a first order Markov process {πz0z|²0²} displaying a correlation between idiosyncratic
and aggregate shocks. Prices are determined in competitive markets according to the
marginal productivity of each factor : r = zFK (K,L) and w = zFL (K,L) . Thus prices
vary randomly according to the joint distribution λ(k, ²) over individual capital level
and employment opportunity and the recursive competitive equilibrium includes a law of
motion H mapping today’s distribution λ into tomorrow’s distribution λ0 = H(λ, z, z0) .
The resolution of the model is based on Krusell and Smith (1998) simulation algorithm
which breaks down the evolution of the wealth distribution to that of the mean.
3 Results
The comparative analysis is run on the American and the European labor markets in
quarters. In the American case, we closely follow Krusell and Smith (1998) by reproducing
the movements observed in postwar output fluctuations, which implies zg = 1.01, zb = 0.99
, ug = 10% and ub = 4%. The process for (z, ²) is chosen so that the average duration
of each aggregate state is set to 2 years and the expected duration of unemployment is
1.5 quarters in good times and 2.5 quarters in bad times. Concerning European business
cycles, we only modify the labor market features for the sake of comparison. By using
Blanchard and Wolfers’ (2000) data over the period 1960-1995, we find an unemployment
rate of 13 % (7%) and an average unemployment duration of 6 quarters (4 quarters)
during booms (recessions) respectively. In the economy with unemployment insurance,
the replacement rate is set to the average European level of ρ = 0.5 (Martin 1996).
Eventually, the preferences and the technology parameters take on the standard values in
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the literature1 (Krusell and Smith 1998).
We measure the welfare gain of moving from an economy without unemployment
benefit to an economy with public insurance as a multiplicative increase in consumption
1 +Ψ required to make an agent be equally well oﬀ under the two institutional set-ups :
E0{u(c(1 +Ψ)) | b = 0} = E0{u(c) | b > 0}
Note that the steady state capital stocks are diﬀerent in the two economies as indi-
viduals have less incentive to save if they are entitled to unemployment benefits. Thus
one has to take into account the transition path of capital accumulation in order to make
things comparable. Henceforth all the welfare measures are based on the expected utility
of individuals at date 0 and we assume that all individuals start with no capital initially2.
3.1 Average welfare gains
On average, we find consistent welfare gains from UI in an incomplete markets economy
characterized by business cycles - reported in Table 1. In the US, the average welfare
increases by 0.94% under aggregate uncertainty (Tab1 - M1) while it merely reaches 0.4
% without such aggregate risks (Tab1 - M4). Moreover, the average welfare increases
with the severity of the labor market cycles. The average welfare gain is twice as high
in the European case (1.82%) as that found in the American case. Once again, ignoring
business cycles leads to a decrease by half of this average welfare measure. This result is
due to the mean-preserving aggregate shock which widens the dispersion of risks. Thus
on average, risk-averse agents are in favour of additional public insurance as the level of
uncertainty increases.
However aggregate risks can have diﬀerent causes. The candidates are i) technological
shocks, ii) price fluctuations and iii) employment fluctuations. To disentangle these ef-
fects, we compare diﬀerent economies in which the channels are progressively shut down.
The full benchmark economy is referred as model M1. We then first eliminate the tech-
nological shock by setting z at its unconditional mean z¯ = 1 in model M2. We then
remove the pro-cyclicity of employment by setting the unemployment rate and the un-
employment duration at their unconditional means u¯ in model M3. This economy is only
characterized by idiosyncratic risks. Yet, we maintain the prices faced in economy M2 so
that the welfare diﬀerences between M2 and M3 only capture employment eﬀects. We
end up this experiment by a model M4 with only idiosyncratic unemployment risks as in
M3 but with endogenous prices. The diﬀerence between M2→M4 and M2→M3 (M2→M3
1We use a relative risk aversion σ = 1, a discounting factor β = 0.99, a capital share α = 0.36 and a
depreciation rate δ = 0.025. The borrowing constraint k
¯
is set to one third of the average wage.
2This assumption raises a problem when prices are endogenous and depend on the aggregate level of
the capital stock. To address this issue, we split the population between non-wealthy and wealthy people
in an overlapping generation model style. The former group could be considered as the first generation
who faces the price levels imposed by the accumulation behavior of elders. In the simulation, we identify
10000 such agents for 1000 periods.
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- M2→M4) measures the welfare gains from eliminating price fluctuations. This strategy
closely follows the method used by Storesletten and al. (2001) to remove business cycles.
Consider first the welfare gain from UI in economies with unemployment and price
fluctuations. In that case, removing the technological shock (M1→M2) does not matter
that much, the welfare diﬀerence being almost nil. Things change when one focuses on
the contra-cyclicity of unemployment rates. Holding prices constant, the welfare gains
from UI decrease from 0.92% under contra-cyclical unemployment rates to 0.59% under
a-cyclical unemployment rates (Tab. 1 : M2→M3). Eventually, the average impact of
prices fluctuations (M2→M3 - M2→M4) depends mainly on the magnitude of business
cycles. In the European case, they account for nearly half of the diﬀerence in UI average
welfare gains between an economy with business cycles and an economy without them.
In contrast, this diﬀerence is almost nil in the United States. This discrepancy is brought
about by the diﬀerent magnitude in aggregate risks. The more aggregate uncertainty
there is, the higher will be the variation in aggregate quantities and prices and the greater
will be the gains from additional public insurance. However, such gains only hold on
average and might disappear when one turns to households at the extremes of the wealth
distribution.
Tab.1 - Average welfare gains from UI
Gains % Eliminated eﬀects Commentary
US Europe
M1 0.94 1.82 Full business cycles
M2 0.92 1.79 z¯ No technological shock
M3 0.59 1.51 z¯, u¯ r¯2, w¯2 No aggregate risks + Exogenous prices
M4 0.40 1.18 z¯, u¯ r∗4, w
∗
4 No aggregate risks + Endogenous prices
3.2 Heterogeneity of welfare gains
Table 2 decomposes the welfare gains from UI by utility percentiles in the American and
the European cases. For example the column 1% provides the welfare diﬀerence between
the 1% least fortunate people living in an economy without public insurance and those
living in an economy with UI. Note that this analysis closely matches a decomposition by
wealth levels. The lowest (highest) expected utilities refer to people who have experienced
the highest unemployment (employment) spell and who end up with the lowest (highest)
level of assets.
Tab.2 - Decomposition of welfare gains from UI
US Europe
1% 25% 50% 75% 99% 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
M1 6.35 2.07 .53 -.46 -1.88 17.29 3.46 0.867 -1.02 -3.60
M2 6.30 2.05 .51 -.44 -1.81 17.25 3.42 0.83 -1.00 -3.57
M3 7.73 1.52 .17 -.92 -2.55 17.69 3.19 0.33 -1.62 -3.96
M4 7.69 1.50 .15 -.94 -2.56 17.34 2.86 0.02 -1.94 -4.30
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This analysis provides two key insights. The first and more expected one is that
the welfare gain from UI is a decreasing function of wealth. The poorest benefit much
more from public insurance than the average since they consist of borrowing-constrained
unemployed people who do not have private means to smooth their consumption. Tab.
2 (M1 - US) indicates that their welfare gain is six times as high as the average welfare
gain in the American case. By contrast, the wealthiest lose from UI since they mainly
consist of employed people who are rich enough to self-insure but who do have to pay
taxes for public unemployment provision. A corollary of this eﬀect is that the UI welfare
gains for the poorest increase as the labor market cycles become more stringent. Tab. 2
(M1 - Europe) suggests that the welfare gain for the 1% poorest is three times higher in
European economies compared to the American one. Inversely the welfare losses are much
higher for the wealthiest in the European case compared to their American counterparts
as they have to pay higher taxes.
The second key and more paradoxical result is linked to the distributional eﬀects of
aggregate fluctuations. Contrary to the previous average evaluation, introducing aggre-
gate fluctuations decreases the welfare gains or losses from UI as far as the two extremes
of the wealth distribution are concerned. Let us focus on the plight of the poorest. Tab.
2 suggests that their welfare gain from UI decreases on average by 18% in the US and 3%
in Europe when business cycles are taken into account (comparison of M1-M2 with M3-
M4). To understand the mechanism at work, one has to disentangle the two competing
employment and price eﬀects. Aggregate fluctuations increase employment uncertainty
and should thus increase the UI welfare gain for those who are the most exposed to unem-
ployment risks. But this higher employment uncertainty also increases the precautionary
savings motive which rises the aggregate capital stock, the labor productivity and thus
wages.
This price eﬀect is quantitatively quite relevant. For example in the American case, the
average capital rises by 0.7% in the presence of aggregate uncertainty (M4→M1), leading
to an average increase by 1.27% of the wage mean. It turns out that this favorable price
eﬀect for the poorest dominates the detrimental employment eﬀect, in particular in the
American case in which unemployment fluctuations are less stringent than in Europe.
In conclusion, everything works as if aggregate fluctuations reduce the inequality gap
between the poorest and the richest by increasing wages and decreasing rental rates in a
general equilibrium incomplete markets framework.
4 Conclusion
This paper has reconsidered the welfare benefit of unemployment insurance when indi-
viduals may also use self-insurance on the credit market. A key extension of the model
is to run this welfare analysis in the context of aggregate employment and prices fluc-
tuations. It turns out that prices have distributional eﬀects that are beneficial to the
poorest despite the increase in unemployment uncertainty. More generally, the interac-
tion between price fluctuations and wealth heterogeneity is likely to challenge traditional
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public redistributive policies in more fully-fledged models.
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